I really don't either, but Chalmers has been setting the pace with regard to this issue since his book The Conscious Mind came out in 1996, and he thinks that zombies are conceivable and so metaphysically possible.
How so?
Perhaps I shouldn't have said completely nutty, but nuttier than a physicalist / functionalist view of the mental. I'll take David Chalmers and Frank Jackson (property dualists who have flirted with Epiphenomenalism) as specific targets. Chalmer's conceivability arguments are his main support for Epiphenomenalism, and these arguments rest on his development of the 2-D semantic framework, which I think is artificial and misguided. In my more cynical moments, It seems like something he's cooked up to get the philosophy of mind results he wants. As far as Jackson goes, I take Katalin Balog's "Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind Body Problem" (Phil. Review vol 108 no. 4, Oct 1999) to present a good argument against the possibility of a fully intentional being which lacks any phenomenal consciousness (a "zombie"), the existence of which is supposed to lead one to the Epiphenomenalist position. In sum, I think a more convincing semantic theory would be less likely to tempt one to the Epiphenomenalist position. And once we had such a theory, I believe zombies of the type Chalmers thinks are possible would seem much less plausible. BTW - I found the article Gyan was seeking and put it on the web, along with the Balog that I just mentioned.
I anticipate the advances of cognitive science just as much as the next guy. I really do think it's our best hope at gaining insight into mental phenomena. No disagreement there. The reason I shy away from thinking it will reveal the "ultimate nature of the mental" is that cognitive neuroscience, as a hypothetical deductive scheme for investigating physical phenomena must remain silent about non-physical phenomena, if there are any. It seems possible, however unlikely, that consciousness is a not a physical phenomena, but rather an epiphenomenon of purely physical brain processes. Of course, we're likely on the same page regarding this; I think Epiphenomenalism is completely nutty. But until there's a good argument for why it's wrong, I don't think we can dismiss it. Until we can dismiss theses like this, I don't think we can say that we understand the ultimate nature of the mental.
I'm not saying that the result of science aren't more satisfying than the "results" of philosophy. Of course they're more satisfying. But it seems to me that before we can begin a rigorous science program, we must have agreed upon at least a few philosophical views -- such as the only things are physical things. Any arguments for those views can't be made from within a materialistic scientific framework.
Also it will be natural scientist in the end who is going to find the answer to this question
It's unclear whether the natural sciences are even suited to pose the question to which you claim they will find the answer.
...this is what every natural scientist secretly (or not) suspects while listening to philosophers: lots of fancy talk without ever understanding what the hell they're talking about.
I was sympathetic to this view before I became a student of philosophy. And, of course, I'm still a bit skeptical when any one of them (me included) puts forth a thesis peppered, perhaps unnecessarily, with semi-technical verbiage. But I've come to see how philosophers view natural scientists when those scientists start putting forth philosophical views. The natural scientists seem, on balance, to have less facility with a cogent statements of philosophical theses, less ability to appreciate the commitments incurred by their positions and less flexibility in responding to criticisms of their views. In short, it seems like many of the natural scientists who put forth philosophical views do so ham-fistedly, and assume just because they can't appreciate the subtlety of the dialectic that their (philosopher) interlocutors have no understanding of "what the hell their talking about."
I really don't either, but Chalmers has been setting the pace with regard to this issue since his book The Conscious Mind came out in 1996, and he thinks that zombies are conceivable and so metaphysically possible.
posted by Wash Jones 19 years ago
How so?
Perhaps I shouldn't have said completely nutty, but nuttier than a physicalist / functionalist view of the mental. I'll take David Chalmers and Frank Jackson (property dualists who have flirted with Epiphenomenalism) as specific targets. Chalmer's conceivability arguments are his main support for Epiphenomenalism, and these arguments rest on his development of the 2-D semantic framework, which I think is artificial and misguided. In my more cynical moments, It seems like something he's cooked up to get the philosophy of mind results he wants. As far as Jackson goes, I take Katalin Balog's "Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind Body Problem" (Phil. Review vol 108 no. 4, Oct 1999) to present a good argument against the possibility of a fully intentional being which lacks any phenomenal consciousness (a "zombie"), the existence of which is supposed to lead one to the Epiphenomenalist position. In sum, I think a more convincing semantic theory would be less likely to tempt one to the Epiphenomenalist position. And once we had such a theory, I believe zombies of the type Chalmers thinks are possible would seem much less plausible. BTW - I found the article Gyan was seeking and put it on the web, along with the Balog that I just mentioned.
posted by Wash Jones 19 years ago
I anticipate the advances of cognitive science just as much as the next guy. I really do think it's our best hope at gaining insight into mental phenomena. No disagreement there. The reason I shy away from thinking it will reveal the "ultimate nature of the mental" is that cognitive neuroscience, as a hypothetical deductive scheme for investigating physical phenomena must remain silent about non-physical phenomena, if there are any. It seems possible, however unlikely, that consciousness is a not a physical phenomena, but rather an epiphenomenon of purely physical brain processes. Of course, we're likely on the same page regarding this; I think Epiphenomenalism is completely nutty. But until there's a good argument for why it's wrong, I don't think we can dismiss it. Until we can dismiss theses like this, I don't think we can say that we understand the ultimate nature of the mental. I'm not saying that the result of science aren't more satisfying than the "results" of philosophy. Of course they're more satisfying. But it seems to me that before we can begin a rigorous science program, we must have agreed upon at least a few philosophical views -- such as the only things are physical things. Any arguments for those views can't be made from within a materialistic scientific framework.
posted by Wash Jones 19 years ago
Also it will be natural scientist in the end who is going to find the answer to this question It's unclear whether the natural sciences are even suited to pose the question to which you claim they will find the answer.
posted by Wash Jones 19 years ago
...this is what every natural scientist secretly (or not) suspects while listening to philosophers: lots of fancy talk without ever understanding what the hell they're talking about. I was sympathetic to this view before I became a student of philosophy. And, of course, I'm still a bit skeptical when any one of them (me included) puts forth a thesis peppered, perhaps unnecessarily, with semi-technical verbiage. But I've come to see how philosophers view natural scientists when those scientists start putting forth philosophical views. The natural scientists seem, on balance, to have less facility with a cogent statements of philosophical theses, less ability to appreciate the commitments incurred by their positions and less flexibility in responding to criticisms of their views. In short, it seems like many of the natural scientists who put forth philosophical views do so ham-fistedly, and assume just because they can't appreciate the subtlety of the dialectic that their (philosopher) interlocutors have no understanding of "what the hell their talking about."
posted by Wash Jones 19 years ago
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